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Reward properties of stimuli can undergo sudden changes, and the detection of these ‘reversals’ is often
made difficult by the probabilistic nature of rewards/punishments. Here we tested whether and how
humans use social information (someone else’s choices) to overcome uncertainty during reversal learn-
ing. We show a substantial social influence during reversal learning, which was modulated by the type of
observed behavior. Participants frequently followed observed conservative choices (no switches after
punishment) made by the (fictitious) other player but ignored impulsive choices (switches), even though
the experiment was set up so that both types of response behavior would be similarly beneficial/detri-
mental (Study 1). Computational modeling showed that participants integrated the observed choices
as a ‘social prediction error’ instead of ignoring or blindly following the other player. Modeling also con-
firmed higher learning rates for ‘conservative’ versus ‘impulsive’ social prediction errors. Importantly,
this ‘conservative bias’ was boosted by interpersonal similarity, which in conjunction with the lack of
effects observed in a non-social control experiment (Study 2) confirmed its social nature. A third study
suggested that relative weighting of observed impulsive responses increased with increased volatility
(frequency of reversals). Finally, simulations showed that in the present paradigm integrating social
and reward information was not necessarily more adaptive to maximize earnings than learning from
reward alone. Moreover, integrating social information increased accuracy only when conservative and
impulsive choices were weighted similarly during learning. These findings suggest that to guide decisions
in choice contexts that involve reward reversals humans utilize social cues conforming with their precon-
ceptions more strongly than cues conflicting with them, especially when the other is similar.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Adaptive behavior depends on learning and retaining associa-
tions between specific stimuli or responses on the one hand and
positive or negative outcomes (reward or punishment) on the
other. In a complex and dynamic environment organisms must
also adequately respond to sudden changes in those associations
and re-learn established contingencies. A widely used experimen-
tal tool to study this process in animals and humans is reversal
learning (Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; Dias, Robbins, &
Roberts, 1996; Jones & Mishkin, 1972). In a typical setup, human
participants learn to choose one of two simple visual stimuli by
receiving monetary rewards for correct responses (stimulus A)and being punished by monetary loss for incorrect responses
(stimulus B). After a variable number of trials, these contingencies
are reversed so that the participant will be rewarded for choosing B
and be punished for choosing A. Trial-by-trial choices in this task
can be predicted by the algorithms of reinforcement learning mod-
els which are based on the calculation of reward prediction errors
(Jocham, Neumann, Klein, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2009).1.1. Social information and decision-making
Critically, in real-life situations learning of reward contingen-
cies is not only achieved by trial-and-error and reward prediction
errors but also by social learning, that is, by observing the choices
of other agents who are exposed to the same or similar decisional
contexts. In the majority of everyday choice situations (e.g. choos-
ing between alternative products or services) social information is
readily available either through behavioral observation of others or
1 For interpretation of color in Fig. 1, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.
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Observational factors can be expected to become especially impor-
tant if well-established behavioral choice routines need to be
revised because the expected outcome is not received or experi-
enced as less rewarding. In such situations the possibility of a
change in the underlying reward probabilities (e.g., the quality of
the usually preferred product/service has changed) will evoke deci-
sional uncertainty which is a potent trigger for ‘social reality test-
ing’, that is, the reliance on others to resolve ambiguity (Festinger,
1950). The literature to date has ignored whether information
about others’ choices affects responding to sudden changes in
reward properties of a stimulus as implemented in the reversal
learning task. This is surprising given the evidence that other basic
cognitive processes, such as perceptual judgments, can profoundly
be shaped by social influence (Asch, 1956; Baron, Vandello, &
Brunsman, 1996).
Social influence can be governed, on the one hand, by socio-
normative mechanisms, originating from the influenced person’s
motivation to gain social approval if the influencing person is pre-
sent (as in Asch’s classic line discrimination studies). On the other
hand, it can also arise in the absence the influencing person and
social pressure, being motivated by informational needs (Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955) and the wish to resolve ambiguity to optimize
one’s outcomes. Such informational social influence is likely to
operate in choice decisions involving uncertain rewards and a
few studies have begun to document social influences on proba-
bilistic reward learning. However, these studies used fixed (Biele,
Rieskamp, Krugel, & Heekeren, 2011; Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, &
Schultz, 2010) or gradually changing (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, &
Rushworth, 2008; Cooper, Dunne, Furey, & O’Doherty, 2012)
reward contingencies rather than a setup involving unexpected
reversals.
1.2. Predictions for the use of social information during reversal
learning
The primary goal of the present studies was to explore the use
of social information (observed choices by another agent) during
reversal learning, specifically, how such social influence is medi-
ated by the (i) type of observed choice behavior (conservative ver-
sus impulsive) and (ii) the similarity of the observed agent.
The differentiation between conservative and impulsive choices
during reversal learning arises as a result of the task-inherent com-
bination of probabilistic reward and possibility of reversals. In
other words, even if reward contingencies have not changed, cor-
rect choices are occasionally punished by monetary losses (so-
called Probabilistic Errors, ProbErrs). Consequently, after each pun-
ishment occurring against the background of correct responses an
individual has to decide whether to switch to the other stimulus
(taking the punishment as indicator of reversed contingencies) or
whether to stay with their previous choice (taking the punishment
as a ProbErr). Accordingly, choices in trials that immediately follow
ProbErrs and reversals can be classified as reflecting either a con-
servative or an impulsive type of choice behavior. Stay responses
correspond to conservative choices as the agent relies on accumu-
lated information about a specific choice option – which has been
gathered across a number of trials before the unexpected punish-
ment – rather than trying a new option. This can be seen in analogy
to an exploitative decision-making strategy in multi-armed bandit
problems, in which multiple choice options with varying pay-offs
are available (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). Conversely, switch
responses can be seen as impulsive choices (Fineberg et al., 2010),
reflecting an abrupt change of choice behavior based on single
events without consideration of the previous choice history.
Importantly, adaptive behavior during reversal learning requires
the dynamic use of both types of behavior. Although impulsiveresponses manifest as errors in the trial(s) after ProbErrs (=post-
ProbErr choice) they lead to correct choices in the trials(s) after
true reversal events. Vice versa, conservative responses increase
accuracy after ProbErrs but lead to incorrect choices (‘persevera
tions’) after reversal events. The key question addressed in the pre-
sent framework was whether observing someone else making con-
servative choices affects our own choices differently than
observing someone else making impulsive choices.
Diverging effects for observed conservative versus impulsive
choices can be predicted from findings about the biased use of
information during individual decision-making. Thus, it is possible
that learners take into account only social information conforming
to their preconception or expectation about the correct versus
incorrect stimulus (established before the other player’s choice is
observed). This preconception is based on the learner’s more fre-
quently chosen stimulus in a given reversal episode and thus usu-
ally corresponds to a bias towards conservative choices made by
the observed other. Such selective use of social information would
parallel a ‘confirmation’ bias described in the context of individual
decision-making (Nickerson, 1998). Conversely, a social influence
bias towards the other’s impulsive choices may arise if observa-
tional reversal learning is expectation-free but driven by the higher
saliency of impulsive (switch) responses occurring against the
stream of standard (non-switch) choices between two reversals.
Apart from the type of observed choice behavior, the present
studies aimed to examine social influence on reversal learning as
a function of perceived similarity of the observed agent. Similarity
has been shown to influence different cognitive processes across a
wide range of phenomena, including decision-making (Kahneman
& Miller, 1986). Similarity is also effective in modulating a variety
of social behaviors, ranging from the experience of vicarious
reward (Mobbs et al., 2009) to cooperative behavior (Mussweiler
& Ockenfels, 2013). Pertinent to the present work, the behavior
and opinions of similar versus dissimilar others are more likely
to be imitated (Guéguen & Martin, 2009). Moreover, requests from
similar others are more likely to be complied with than requests
from dissimilar others, suggesting that similarity directly affects
the degree of social influence (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado,
& Anderson, 2004).
With regard to the role of similarity, we thus hypothesized that
any bias in the following of behavioral patterns of the observed
agent should be exaggerated (i.e. social learning rates should be
increased) if this person shares a characteristic feature with the
observing agent.2. General methods
2.1. The social reversal learning task
On each trial of the present task, participants observed the
response of a (fictitious) other player before they were required
to make their own choice. Reversal learning performance was
assessed in two different blocks, examining choice behavior with-
out (private/baseline block, Fig. 1A) and with (social block, Fig. 1B)
exposure to the choices made by a (fictitious) previous participant.
In both blocks, participants learned to choose one of two simulta-
neously presented colors1 (‘blue’ and ‘green’) by receiving monetary
reward (+1 pence [p]) or punishment (1p) contingent on their
choice (e.g. +1p for ‘blue’ and 1p for ‘green’).
After a variable number of trials unknown to the participants,
reward/punishment contingencies were reversed so that the previ-
ously rewarded stimulus was now punished and vice versa (1p
Fig. 1. Design of the social reversal learning task illustrating one reversal episode. (A) Private condition. Crosses illustrate hypothetical choices. Feedback was given
instantaneously after a choice had been made. A varying number of probabilistic errors showing ‘wrong’ feedback after correct choices were presented before each reversal.
(B) The two social conditions involving the presentation of conservative versus impulsive choices made by a (fictitious) other player who either shared the same birthday as
the participant (similar-other group) or not (dissimilar-other group). The other player’s choices were indicated by a white frame surrounding his/her choice before the real
participant made his/her choice. Crosses show hypothetical choices reflecting imitative response behavior. Note that participants were exposed to choices made by ONE other
player who displayed conservative AND impulsive choices in different reversal episodes. As illustrated, the number of errors made by the other player was balanced between
the conservative and impulsive condition.
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was interspersed at random positions between two reversals so
that a normally correct response was unexpectedly punished.
The total number of reversal and ProbErr events was matched
between the different conditions. Using ProbErr trials (and thus a
‘pseudo-probabilistic’ approach) rather than a truly probabilistic
design (with correct choices being rewarded, for instance, with a
probability of 0.9 and punished with a probability of 0.1) allowed
us to control the number of punishments (and thus objective per-
formance of the other player) across social conditions. Overall, the
reward ratio in our pseudo-probabilistic setup (including 1–3 pun-
ishments per 7–15 trials in Study 1) was comparable to a reward
probability of 0.8/0.2, typically used in other probabilistic reward
learning tasks.
2.2. Choice behavior and similarity of the other player
In each trial of the social block, choices made by the other
player were presented before participants made their own choice.
(i) The first experimental manipulation concerned the response of
the other player responded in the first trial (+1) after an unex-
pected punishment. We manipulated the other player’s choices
to simulate (a) ‘conservative’ (stay response) versus (b) ‘impulsive’
(switch response) choice behavior as described above (1.1). After
each ProbErr in a given reversal episode (between two consecutive
reversals) the other player consistently made either conservative
(stay) or impulsive (switch) responses. The order of conservative/
impulsive reversal episodes was randomized with the constraint
of yielding a specific number of episodes per condition (see Meth-
ods Study 1 and 2). Changing the other player’s choice behavior
between episodes (but not within episodes) aimed to simulate
dynamic changes in decision-making strategies as observed in nat-
ural contexts. In addition, after a few reversal events the conserva-
tive player perseverated to the previously rewarded stimulus for
two or three trials after the reversal. Importantly, inclusion of these
‘social perseveration’ trials helped to balance the number of ‘errors’(wrong choices) committed by the other player in the conservative
versus impulsive condition: There were 30 observed conser-
vative versus 20 observed impulsive errors in Study 1 and 12
conservative and 16 impulsive errors in Study 2. Thus, overall
following conservative versus impulsive choices was comparably
beneficial/detrimental, with a slight disadvantage for conservative
choices in Study 1 and the opposite pattern in the replication study
(Study 2) so that any effects related to the objective performance of
the other player were counterbalanced across the two studies. It
should be noted that in contrast to previous studies (e.g. Burke
et al., 2010), we did not manipulate and present outcomes of the
observed player separately. Nonetheless, as participants were
made to believe that the other player was exposed to the exact
same reward/punishment contingencies, they could easily infer
after each trial whether the observed choice was correct or
incorrect.
(ii) The second manipulation was based on an ‘incidental simi-
larity’ technique (Burger et al., 2004) that allowed us to create an
association between the participant and the observed agent with-
out providing information relevant to the task: Before the social
block participants were presented with a screen showing basic
information about the other player (see Methods Study 1). For half
of the participants, this information included a date of birth of the
observed player matching the day and month of their own birthday
(similar-other group), whereas for the other half the birthdays did
not match (dissimilar-other group). Previous research has demon-
strated that this manipulation critically determines how informa-
tion about others influences the self (Brown & Novick, 1992).
3. Study 1
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
34 volunteers participated in Study 1. Data from two partici-
pants were excluded due to the use of wrong response keys or
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male; mean age M = 20.82 years, SD = 4.67). All participants (Stud-
ies 1 and 2) were members of Cardiff University who gave written
informed consent to take part in the studies that had been
approved by the School of Psychology’s Ethics Committee, Cardiff
University. For taking part, participants received course credits or
were paid £6 per hour.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
The screen shown throughout the learning session consisted of
two colored squares (blue and green) presented left and right of
the center of the monitor on a black background. At all times, par-
ticipants also could see their accumulated earnings (£), shown cen-
trally below the colors and updated in each trial synchronously
with the feedback. The beginning of each choice trial was indicated
by the appearance of two (private block) or one (social block) white
frame(s) surrounding (one of) the colors. These response cues
remained on the screen until the participants made their choice
by pressing the ‘10 or ‘30 key on the keyboard. A black cross inside
the chosen colored square, shown for 500 ms after response onset,
indicated the participant’s choice. Feedback was then given using a
white ‘smiley’ (correct choice) or red ‘frowny’ (incorrect choice),
centrally presented for 1000 ms. Trials were separated by an
Inter-Trial-Interval (ITI) randomly varying between 700 and
1400 ms.
Private and social blocks were presented in counterbalanced
order. The private block consisted of 12 reversal episodes (6 blue
correct, 6 green correct episodes), containing a pseudo-
randomized number of choice trials that varied between 7 and
15 between two reversals (mean episode length = 11 trials). Within
each reversal episode we included 1–3 probabilistic error (ProbErr)
trials in which ‘wrong’-feedback was given for correct choices (and
‘correct’-feedback for wrong choices), even though the reward con-
tingencies had not changed. Across the 12 reversal episodes, we
presented 20 ProbErr trials, with 6 episodes containing only 1 Pro-
bErr, 4 episodes containing 2 ProbErrs and 2 episodes containing 3
ProbErrs in random order. Within a reversal episode, ProbErrs
could occur at a random position between the third trial after
the previous reversal and two trials before the next reversal. We
implemented the same trial structure as above in the social block
so that each condition was matched with regard to the number
of choice trials and the number of ProbErrs. The social block com-
prised 36 reversal episodes. Before the social block participants
received written instructions that they would now be able to
observe what an anonymous other player – who received exactly
the same learning sequence as they – chose in a previous study.
15 of the participants were presented with a similar player and
17 with a dissimilar player (see below).
In trials after reversals the other player made impulsive (=cor-
rect) choices in 24 of the 36 reversal episodes while in the other
12 episodes he/she made conservative choices, perseverating to
the previously rewarded color for 2 (6 episodes) or 3 (6 episodes)
trials and leading to a total of 30 social perseveration trials. Vice
versa for +1 trials after ProbErrs, participants observed conserva-
tive choices of the other player in 24 episodes and impulsive
choices in the 12 other episodes. The order of episodes with con-
servative versus impulsive choices was freely randomized. In Pro-
bErr and reversal trials, the other player always responded
incorrectly. Except for ProbErr/reversal trials and the trials after
ProbErrs/reversals (+1 and perseveration trials), the other player
always responded correctly (standard trials).
3.1.3. Social cover story and similarity manipulation
Before the social block, participants were instructed to initiate a
‘random generator’ on the computer that selected a specific partic-
ipant from a (fictitious) other study, showing a rapid sequence of‘subject codes’ (e.g. PJ_008) that seemingly stopped at a random
point. Participants were told that they would see choices made
by the selected participant and received some basic information
about the other player on the screen. Based on a pre-
experimental demographic questionnaire, the experimenter had
manipulated this information shortly before testing while the par-
ticipants had been waiting in a separate room. It included (i) the
other player’s ‘gender’ (either ‘male’ or ‘female’ and always match-
ing the participant’s own gender), ‘date of data collection’ in the
previous study (always ‘3 Nov 20100), and (iii) the other player’s
birthday. While the birth year was always ‘19890, the other
player’s day and month of birth was manipulated to either match
the real player’s birthday or not (default birthday: ‘25 Apr’).3.1.4. Data analysis
3.1.4.1. Accuracy analysis. We assessed social influences on reversal
learning by calculating for each participant trial-based average
accuracy scores (% choices corresponding to the correct color of
each reversal episode) as a function of condition (private, conserva-
tive and impulsive) and relative trial position within a reversal epi-
sode. For calculating accuracy scores for trials surrounding critical
events (ProbErrs or reversals), only trials were included that were
unaffected by a second ProbErr or reversal either in the preceding
trial, in the trial before the preceding trial or in the trial directly fol-
lowing the target trial.
As shown in Fig. 3, apparent differences between the private,
conservative and impulsive conditions occurred only in the first
two trials (+1,+2) after ProbErr or reversal events, that is, there
were no accuracy (switch/stay tendency) differences between the
private versus social conditions in standard trials. We used
planned comparisons (one-tailed paired t-tests) in post-ProbErr
trials +1 and +2 to test for accuracy increases in the conservative
condition and accuracy decreases in the impulsive condition,
respectively, relative to the private condition. We tested for the
opposite pattern (accuracy decrease in conservative, accuracy
increase in impulsive condition) in post-reversal trials +1 and +2.
Importantly, by measuring social influence in the conservative ver-
sus impulsive condition as a combined pattern of accuracy increase
and decrease, any global performance difference between the pri-
vate and social block was unlikely to confound the present effects.
Effect sizes for significant differences between the two social con-
ditions and the private condition were calculated using Cohen’s d
for paired samples (d = D/SDD, where D is the mean difference
score and SDD is the standard deviation of the difference scores).3.1.4.2. Computational modeling. In addition to analyses of choice
behavior averaged across trials, we used computational modeling
to investigate the relative contribution of reward-based and social
trajectories to drive single-trial choices. Specifically, we tested how
well standard reinforcement learning algorithms (Q-learning;
Watkins & Dayan, 1992) predicted individual choices in the social
block and compared this to several social Q-learning variants that
we developed to model observational factors.
Standard Q-learning has successfully been shown to predict
responses in a variety of (non-social) learning tasks, including
reversal learning (Jocham et al., 2009). It assumes that the choice
between two stimuli A and B is determined by action values
(Q-values) that are associated with each choice option and can vary
between 0 and 1. Q-values are updated after each choice trial tak-
ing into account the reward prediction error dr, that is, the differ-
ence between the observed outcome (=1 or 0 in binary learning)
and the expected outcome (=current Q-value) so that dr = reward
(t)  Q(t). The reward prediction error is additionally weighted
by the learning rate ar so that in trial t + 1, Q is recalculated by Q
(t + 1) = Q(t) + ar ⁄ dr(t).
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ally exclusive, we updated Q-values after each trial for both the
blue color (Qblue) and the green color (Qgreen), with Qgreen = 1 -
 Qblue. At the start of the private and social learning task, we set
both Q-values to 0.5. Before model predictions were tested against
the observed choices, we transformed Q-values into action selec-
tion probabilities (Pblue or Pgreen), using a softmax function
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). The softmax function (see Fig. 2) estimates
the probability of the participant choosing a specific option in each
trial by adjusting Q-values by an estimate of the ‘temperature’ b
(=degree of randomness in the participant’s choices).
In our social Q-learning variants we modeled observed choices
of the other player as a ‘social prediction error’ ds. Similar to the
standard reward prediction error dr, we modeled ds as the differ-
ence between an internally stored representation of each choice
option’s value and an external event revising this value. In partic-
ular, we defined ds as the extent of how much the observed choice
matches or deviates from the participant’s current choice prefer-
ence as defined by the higher of the two current Q-values, i.e.
ds = observed choice(t) Q(t): If Qblue was higher at the start of trial t
(before the other player’s choice was seen and feedback was given),
observing the other choosing blue resulted in a ds(t) = 1  Qblue(t),
whereas a green choice by the other was modeled as ds(t) =
0  Qblue(t). Vice versa, when Qgreen(t) was higher than Qblue(t) at
the start of trial t, we defined ds(t) = 0  Qgreen(t) when the other
player chose blue and ds(t) = 1  Qgreen(t) when the other player
chose green. As a result, conservative choices by the other typically
elicited a positive ds while impulsive choices evoked a negative ds It
should be noted that positive (termed ‘conservative’ ds hereinafter)
versus negative ds (termed ‘impulsive’ ds hereinafter) should not be
confused with positive versus negative reward prediction errors
(dr) in the probabilistic learning literature. In contrast to ds whose
sign we derived from the correspondence to the dominant
choice propensity, the sign of the standard dr is defined based on
choice outcome (reward versus punishment). Social prediction
errors were additionally weighted by the social learning rate as.
We used three classes of models, differing in whether and how
dr and ds were combined to update Q-values: (i) Standard (non-
social) Q-learning: Q-values were updated only by dr weighted
by ar (with as set to 0), after a choice had been made/outcome
had been received (‘Social Ignorer’); (ii) imitative learning: Q-
values were determined only by ds weighted by as (with ar set to
0), after the other player’s choice had been observed but before
one’s own choice was made (‘Blind Follower’), (iii) integrative
learning: Q-values were updated by both dr and ds.
Recent studies showed that with regard to overall performance
measures in probabilistic reward learning tasks, integrative learn-
ing strategies are superior relative to purely social (imitative) or
non-social (reward-based only) strategies (Burke et al., 2010;
Selbing, Lindström, & Olsson, 2014). It should be noted though that
in the present studies we did not aim to examine the general adap-
tivity of different social/non-social learning strategies but rather
compared how different types of observed choice behaviors affect
the integration of social information into learning and thus the
degree of social influence (i.e. the frequency of following observed
choices). Specifically, we examined whether learning rates would
reflect any biases in the integration of social information, such as
increased weighting of expectation-conforming (=conservative)
choices or increased weighting of choices made by similar versus
dissimilar others.
Based on our expectation of differential effects of observed con-
servative versus observed impulsive choices (see Section 1.2), the
integrative model was further differentiated into a sub-model that
used a single as to weight conservative and impulsive ds and a sub-
model that used different as for conservative and impulsive ds.
Moreover, we distinguished instantaneous integrative models(Q-values were updated by ds instantaneously, that is, after the
other player’s response had been observed and before one’s own
choice was made; in a second step the resulting Q-values were then
updated by dr after the outcome had been received) and delayed
integrative models (Q-values were updated by ds with a delay, that
is, after the outcome had been received and after Q-values had
been updated by dr). In contrast to the instantaneous models, the
delayed models were able to capture information about the
correctness of the other player (the magnitude and sign and thus
the differential weighting of ds was determined after Q-values
had been updated by the outcome). Note also that we based ds
on Q-rather than P-values (action probabilities derived from the
softmax function) since the latter yielded on average lower
goodness-of-fit values (cf. Lindström & Olsson, 2015). Fig. 2 shows
a schematic illustration of the integrative models.
We used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974)
based on Log Likelihood Estimates (LLE) as an indicator
of each model’s ability to predict empirical choices. LLEs use the
log of the cumulative product of those action probabilities
(Pblue or Pgreen, see above) that match the actual choice in each trial
t: LLE = log(PtPchoice(t)). We derived LLEs for each participant and
model by extracting the highest LLE (=highest goodness-of-fit
corresponding to the least negative LLE value) obtained from
iterations of free parameters between 0 and 1 using increments of
0.05. LLEs were then transformed into AICs by AIC =2 ⁄ LLE + 2 ⁄ k,
where k is the number of free parameters, with lower values indi-
cating superior fit. The rationale of the AIC is to penalise models
with a higher number of free parameters in order to counteract
the confounding role of model complexity (more complex models
usually show a better data fit). AICs and free parameters (reward
and social learning rates ar and as, temperature b) were further
analyzed by repeated-measurement ANOVAs and paired t-tests.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Accuracy after probabilistic errors
In the trial following the first ProbErr in a reversal episode (+1),
participants performed better in the conservative condition rela-
tive to the private condition, t(31) = 2.00, p = 0.027, Cohen’s
d = 0.35 (Fig. 3A). We also found a trend-level facilitation for the
conservative condition in trial +2 after the first ProbErr, t(31)
= 1.58, p = 0.063, d = 0.28. In contrast, we did not find a reduction
in accuracy in the impulsive condition in the first two trials after
the first ProbErr, ts < 0.30, ps > 0.38. For ‘later’ ProbErrs in a rever-
sal episode – data was collapsed across 2nd and 3rd ProbErrs due
to the small number of episodes presenting three ProbErrs – we
found a delayed benefit, showing increased accuracy in the conser-
vative versus private condition in trial +2, t(31) = 2.38, p = 0.012,
d = 0.42, but not in trial +1, t(31) = 0.62, p = 0.27 (Fig. 3B). Again
we did not find an accuracy impairment in the impulsive relative
to the private condition in trials +1 and +2, ts < 1.0, ps > 0.16.
3.2.2. Accuracy after reversals
Consistent with the post-ProbErr results, social influence was
restricted to the conservative other. After reversals this led to a
decrease of accuracy since the conservative player perseverated
to the previously correct color. These ‘socially induced persevera-
tions’ were apparent in trial +1, t(31) = 1.93, p = 0.032, d = 0.34,
and +2, t(31) = 2.26, p = 0.016, d = 0.40 (Fig. 3C). Observing the
impulsive player who switched to the newly correct color did not
improve accuracy in trials +1 or +2 relative to the private condition,
ts < 0.22, ps > 0.41. To summarize, both post-ProbErr and post-
reversal results showed that participants frequently followed a
conservative (non-switching) other player after their choice had
been unexpectedly punished in the previous trial, while an impul-
sive player was ignored.
Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of two integrative models used to predict trial-by-trial choices during social reversal learning. (A) Instantaneous integration model. After
receiving feedback in trial t0, in trial t1 the participant sees the other player either staying with the previous choice or switching to the other color. The resulting social
prediction error dsocial has a positive (=conservative dsocial) or negative (=impulsive dsocial) sign and is instantaneously used to update Qblue(t0) to Qblue(t1)0 taking into account
the social learning rate asocial. Qblue(t1)0 then determines the action selection probability Pblue(t1) based on a softmax function. After the participant has made his/her choice
and the outcome has been received in trial t1, Qblue(t1)0 is then updated by the reward prediction error dreward weighted by the reward learning rate areward to Qblue(t1).
Qgreen(t1) is computed as 1  Qblue(t1). (B) Delayed integration model. The only difference to the instantaneous integration model is that dsocial of trial t1 is not contributing to
the action selection probability Pblue(t1) but becomes only effective after the outcome has been obtained, that is, after Qblue(t1) has been updated by dreward to Qblue(t1)0 . (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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3.2.3.1. Model fit comparisons. Paired t-tests (two-tailed) showed
that all integrative models performed substantially better than
the standard Q-learning (‘social ignorer’) and imitative (‘blind fol-
lower’) models, all ts > 2.96, all ps < 0.007 (see Table 1 for an over-
view of AICs). This replicates previous work highlighting that both
social (observed choices) and non-social (observed consequences)
information are dynamically combined during reward (Burke
et al., 2010) or aversive (Selbing et al., 2014) learning tasks.To further analyze the integrative models, we entered their AICs
into a repeated-measurement ANOVA with time of integration
(instantaneous vs. delayed) and social learning rate (same as or dif-
ferent as for conservative and impulsive ds) as factors. We found a
main effect of social learning rate, F(1,31) = 4.53, p = 0.041 and an
interaction time of integration x social learning rate, F(1,31) = 5.60,
p = 0.024, indicating a better fit for delayed integration for the
models using different learning rates specifically (see Fig. 4).
Together these results suggest a clear predictive advantage for
Fig. 3. Choice accuracy (for the truly correct color) as a function of trial position and social influence in Study 1. (A, B) Accuracy for trials 3 before to +3 after probabilistic
errors (ProbErr, left) and in more detail for post-ProbErr trials +1 and +2 (right), split for first (A) and late (second/third, B) ProbErrs in a reversal episode. (C) Accuracy for trials
3 before to +3 after reversals (left) and in more detail for post-reversal trials +1 and +2 (right). Error bars show standard errors of the mean. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Number of free parameters, means (standard deviations) of Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and learning rate (ar and as) estimates for reward and social prediction errors (d) of
all models in Study 1.
Model Free parameters AIC ar as (cons./imp. d) as (cons. d) as (imp. d)
Standard Q-learning 2 211.96 (54.89) 0.45 (0.08) – – –
Imitative – same as 2 373.19 (39.30) – 0.8 (0.11) – –
Imitative – different as 3 370.60 (40.22) – – 0.93 (0.25) 0.66 (0.18)
Instantaneous integration – same as 3 205.40 (54.55) 0.46 (0.08) 0.06 (0.07) – –
Instantaneous integration – different as 4 205.54 (54.53) 0.46 (0.07) – 0.09 (0.12) 0.06 (0.07)
Delayed integration – same as 3 205.87 (55.43) 0.53 (0.12) 0.11 (0.10) – –
Delayed integration – different as 4 203.84 (56.38) 0.47 (0.06) – 0.22 (0.14) 0.05 (0.06)
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relying on one source information. Modeling also provided some
evidence for a differential integration of observed conservative
versus impulsive choices but, given the large variability between
individual AICs, overall these effects were weak.
3.2.3.2. Social learning rates. We further examined individuals’
social learning rates (as) derived from the free parameter estima-
tions associated with the best performing model (delayed inte-
gration of ds and dr, different as for conservative versus
impulsive ds). Paired t-tests showed that as was substantially
higher for conservative ds (M = 0.22, 95% CI [0.17,0.27]) versusimpulsive ds (M = 0.05, CI [0.02,0.07]), t(31) = 6.92, p < 0.001,
d = 1.22, suggesting that participants weighted others’ responses
more strongly if they conformed with their current choice prefer-
ence. One might argue that conservative ds received a larger as
because they were smaller in magnitude than impulsive ds so
that net effects on Q-values were balanced. However, the average
product of conservative ds and conservative as (i.e. the net effect
on Q-values) was still larger than then average product of impul-
sive ds and impulsive as: Mean conservative as mean conserva-
tive ds = 0.22  0.44 = 0.10; mean impulsive as mean impulsive
ds = 0.05  0.57 = 0.03. To summarize, the other player’s choice
was more strongly weighted for conservative versus impulsive
Fig. 4. Model fit comparisons in Study 1 using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which corrects for the number of free parameters. The figure shows the differences dAIC
between the standard Q-learning model, which is based on dr only (‘social ignorer’), and the 4 integrative models in which both reward and social information are utilized,
with the integration occurring either instantaneously or with a delay, and with applying either the same or different learning rates to conservative/impulsive ds. A larger dAIC
indicates superior performance. Error bars show standard errors of the difference.
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observed at the level of accuracy data.3.2.3.3. Incidental similarity. We next tested for increased social
learning rates (derived from the best-performing delayed, as dif-
ferentiated model) in those participants who were observing a
similar versus dissimilar player. ANOVA of as values using group
(similar versus dissimilar other) and type of social prediction error
(conservative versus impulsive) showed a significant main effect
of type of as (with higher as for conservative ds), F(1,30) = 54.16,
p < 0.001. We also found a marginally significant interaction
between group and type of as, F(1,30) = 4.04, p = 0.05. Follow-up
tests (one-tailed independent-samples t-tests) revealed that for
the best performing model the similar-other group showed a
higher as for conservative ds relative to the dissimilar-other
group (see Fig. 5), t(31) = 2.06, p = 0.024, d = 0.72. In contrast,
similarity did not lead to a higher as for impulsive ds, t(31)
= 0.12, p = 0.45. Thus, similarity acted to exaggerate the bias
towards expectation-consistent responses of the other player
specifically. Importantly, we found no group differences for sim-
ilarity in any of the other learning parameters, ar: similar other:
M = 0.47, SD = 0.07; dissimilar other: M = 0.47, SD = 0.06; t(30)
= 0.30, p = 0.77; b: similar other: M = 0.19, SD = 0.08; dissimilar
other: M = 0.19, SD = 0.06; t(30) = 0.05, p = 0.96. To summarize,
interpersonal similarity boosted learning from conservative social
prediction errors but did not lead to a general increase of social
influence.4. Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to control for non-social responses
biases resulting from our method of presenting choices made
by another player by a lateral, visual cue. In particular, marking
one of the two choice options by a white frame may have biased
responses at a simple perceptual level through exogenous spatial
cueing. In Study 2 we used the same paradigm as in Study 1 –
showing a white box around one of the colors that switched or
did not switch to the other color after punishments – without
presenting the social cover story (see Section 3.1.3) before the
task. A spatial cueing account would predict that spatial cueing
alone (without social information) will lead to similar results as
in Study 1, specifically an accuracy difference between the condi-
tions in which the correct versus incorrect response was cued
(i.e., increased accuracy for conservative trials relative to impul-
sive trials after PEs and vice versa after reversals). In contrast,
if omitting social information removes or reduces the accuracy
difference between the differentially cued trials, the effects
observed in the previous study could be attributed to social-
cognitive processes.4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
19 students (15 female, 4 male; mean age M = 20.67 years,
SD = 1.37) completed the reversal learning task and received
course credits or payment for their participation. All participants
provided written informed consent, and the protocol had been
approved by the ethics committee of the School of Psychology,
Cardiff University.
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
The reversal learning paradigm was identical to Study 1 with
the exception of the initial task instruction. Instead of being
informed about a randomly selected other player whose responses
participants would observe in the social block, they were simply
told that they would see additional visual information without
any further specification of the nature of this information. As in
the previous study, order of the private and ‘social’ block was
counterbalanced across participants.
4.1.3. Data analysis
We calculated % correct choices for the two trials following Pro-
bErrs and reversals as a function of the ‘choice’ displayed by the
white frame (stay [=conservative] versus switch [=impulsive]). As
a spatial cueing account would predict maximal differences for tri-
als cueing opposite responses, we computed the difference
between stay- and switch-cued trials and directly contrasted this
measure with the same difference calculated for Study 1, using
between-group comparisons (one-tailed two-sample t-tests). In
addition, we compared average accuracy for stay-cued and
switch-cued trials with ‘private’ performance (no lateral visual
cue) in the non-social control experiment (Study 2) separately,
using paired t-tests.
4.2. Results
As illustrated in Fig. 6, reversal learning performance levels in
Study 2 were comparable to those in Study 1. Importantly, we
found cross-study evidence that accuracy differences between
the conservative and impulsive condition in critical trials (stay-
cues versus switch-cues) were smaller in the non-social experi-
ment (Study 2) relative to the social version of the same paradigm
(Study 1). The difference reached significance for post-PE trials +2 t
(49) = 1.70, p = 0.048, and trend-level when accuracy was com-
puted across PE positions and +1/+2 trials, t(49) = 1.43, p = 0.080.
For post-PE trials +1 and post-reversal trials, differences did not
reach significance, ts < 1.01, ps > 0.15.
Separate analyses of accuracy data in Study 2 comparing
conservative/impulsive trials with private trials provided further
Fig. 5. Mean learning rates for ds derived from the best-fitting computational model and split for direction (conservative versus impulsive) of the ds and the two groups of
participants who observed another player either sharing (similar-other group) or not sharing (dissimilar-other group) their own birthday. Error bars show standard errors of
the mean.
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choice accuracy. No significant differences between the social
and the private conditions emerged for post-PE trials: First Pro-
bErr: all ts < 0.73, all ps > 0.47; later ProbErrs: conservative trial
+1 versus private +1: t(18) = 0.90, p = 0.38, conservative +2 versus
private +2: t(18) = 1.19, p = 0.25, impulsive +1 versus private +1:
t(18) = 1.90, p = 0.074, impulsive +2 versus private +2: t(18)
= 0.57, p = 0.58. Moreover, in the first trial after reversals accuracy
was not reduced by observed ‘perseverations’ (conservative condi-
tion), t(18) = 0.47, p = 0.64, nor was it improved by cued switches
(impulsive condition), t(18) = 0.46, p = 0.65, relative to the private
block. Cued switch responses did also not alter accuracy in trial
+2 after reversals, t(18) = 0.02, p = 0.98. The only result comparable
to Study 1 was a decrease in performance in the conservative con-
dition relative to the private condition in trial +2 after reversals, t
(18) = 1.88, p = 0.077 (two-tailed).
However, we suspect that this influence on choice accuracy was
due to a residual attribution of social properties to the spatial cueFig. 6. Choice accuracy as a function of trial position and lateral cue in the non-social cont
errors (ProbErr), shown for first (A) and late (B) ProbErrs in a reversal episode. (C) Accur
mean.by the participants themselves (6 participants actually reported
during debriefing after the task that they believed that the white
box showed responses by another player). Moreover, while spatial
cueing predicts increased accuracy in the conservative relative to
the private condition after probabilistic errors, it predicts an anal-
ogous reduction in accuracy for the impulsive condition (which
cues switch responses) in those trials, which we did not find in
either study. Overall, results of Study 2 thus suggest that present-
ing choice cues in a non-social context removes (or at least sub-
stantially reduces) the specific effects resulting from the
experimental manipulations in the previous studies, providing
supporting evidence for their social nature.
5. Study 3
The first goal of Study 3 was to replicate the general finding of
social influence on reversal learning (Study 1) using data from a
different and larger sample. The second goal of Study 3 was torol experiment (Study 2). (A, B) Accuracy for trials 3 before to +3 after probabilistic
acy for trials 3 before to +3 after reversals. Error bars show standard errors of the
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versus impulsive choices. Specifically, by reducing the number of
trials per reversal episode, Study 3 allowed to examine the role
of reversal volatility on weighting different types of observed
choice behavior. Thus, it is possible that the influence of observed
impulsive choices increases with increased reversal volatility, as
higher volatility may favor exploratory choice behavior. No simi-
larity manipulation was included in Study 2.
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
Data were acquired as part of a multimodal genetic imaging
project at Cardiff University in which 100 volunteers performed
various cognitive tasks while undergoing functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (MRI). All participants provided written informed
consent, and the protocol had been approved by the ethics com-
mittee of the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. Reversal
learning data from 7 participants were incomplete due to technical
problems. All data from the remaining sample (N = 93; 59 female,
34 male, 24.39 years ± 4.54 [SD]) were used for analysis.
5.1.2. Materials and procedure
The overall task structure was identical to the first study but
reversals occurred after a fewer number of trials (pseudo-
randomized between 7 and 11, mean episode length = 9 trials). In
addition, the following task structure was implemented: (i) The
task was split into three blocks, one private block and two social
blocks (social blocks were always presented successively), each
containing 12 reversal episodes. Each of the two social blocks con-
tained 6 conservative and 6 impulsive episodes. (ii) Due the shorter
reversal episodes we reduced the number of ProbErr trials: There
were either one or two ProbErrs between two reversals; per condi-
tion (private, conservative, impulsive) 8 reversal episodes con-
tained 1 ProbErr and 4 episodes contained two ProbErrs. (iii) In
the social blocks half of the post-ProbErr trials (+1) showed conser-
vative choices made by the other, and half of the trials showed
impulsive choices. (iv) After each conservative reversal episode,
the other player perseverated for one trial (+1), while after each
impulsive episode the other player made an impulsive (correct)
choice. (v) The task was not self-paced as in the previous study
but stimuli (for instance, presentation of other player’s response
or reward feedback) had randomized durations in the range of
0.75 s to several seconds.
5.1.3. Data analysis
We used the same methods as in Study 1 to calculate average
accuracy scores. Similarly, the same algorithms as in the first
experiment were applied to model trial-by-trial choices. The only
modifications of the existing functions were as follows: (i) We
added a mathematical rule dealing with ‘miss’ responses – in con-
trast to the (self-paced) first study, misses could occur in Study 3 as
choice cue and feedback stimulus were presented for a limited
amount of time. To keep the number of learning trials contributing
to LLE scores comparable, an action probability Pblue/Pgreen of 0.5
(that is, indecisiveness between blue and green choice) was
assumed for missed trials. (ii) The sign of ds (positive [=conserva-
tive] versus negative [=impulsive]) was not determined by the cur-
rently higher Q-value (Qblue versus Qgreen) but by the more frequent
choice of the participant in the last three trials before the predicted
trial within a given reversal episode: If the dominant choice in the
last three trials was ‘blue’ at the start of trial t, observing the other
choosing ‘blue’ resulted in a ds(t) = 1  Qblue(t), while a ‘green’
choice by the other resulted in as ds(t) = 0  Qblue(t). Vice versa,
when the dominant choice in the last three trials was ‘green’,observing the other choosing ‘blue’ resulted in ds(t) = 0  Qgreen(t)
while a ‘green’ choice led to ds(t) = 1  Qgreen (t).5.2. Results
5.2.1. Accuracy
Despite the changes in task structure relative to Study 1, paired
t-tests confirmed selective facilitation in the conservative condi-
tion after ProbErr trials, showing an accuracy benefit in the two tri-
als after the first (trial +1: t(92) = 5.51, p < 0.001, d = 0.57; +2: t(92)
= 3.15, p = 0.001, d = 0.33) and second ProbErr (+1: t(92) = 4.38,
p < 0.001, d = 0.45; +2: t(92) = 4.37, p < 0.001, d = 0.45), relative to
the private condition (see Fig. 7). Again, the (wrong) impulsive
player did not reduce performance after the first (+1: t(92)
= 1.05, p = 0.15; +2: t(92) = 2.02, p = 0.98) or second ProbErr
(+1: t(92) = 0.86, p = 0.20; +2: t(92) = 0.49, p = 0.69). For accuracy
after reversals, we replicated the detrimental effect in the conser-
vative condition in trial +1 in which the other player perseverated
to the previously correct color, t(92) = 2.93, p = 0.002, d = 0.30.
Importantly, though, we also found a facilitatory influence of the
(correct) impulsive player in trial +1 after reversals showing
improved accuracy relative to the private condition, t(92) = 3.98,
p < 0.001, d = 0.41.5.2.2. Computational modeling
Modeling results replicated lower AICs and thus better
goodness-of-fit for all four integrative models, relative to the imi-
tative models (all ts > 9.11, all ps < 0.001, all ds > 0.95. Compared
to the standard (reward-based) Q-learning model (AIC = 86.28),
both instantaneous integration models achieved better fit (same
as: AIC = 84.56, t(92) = 3.57, p = 0.001, d = 0.37; different as:
AIC = 85.05, t(92) = 2.63, p = 0.010, d = 0.27) while the AICs of the
delayed integration models did not significantly differ from the
standard Q-learning model (same as: AIC = 85.92, t(92) = 1.43,
p = 0.157; different as: AIC = 86.55, t(92) = 1.01, p = 0.319). In
contrast to Study 1, ANOVA of the four integrative models showed
a better fit for models using the same as for conservative versus
impulsive ds (main effect social learning rate, F(1,92) = 29.76,
p < 0.001) and for the instantaneous versus delayed models (main
effect time of integration: F(1,92) = 10.07, p = 0.002). One account
for the better fit of models assuming that the same learning rate
is instantaneously applied to conservative and impulsive predic-
tion errors – rather than assuming a biased and delayed weighting
of conservative choices as in Study 1 – is the relative increase in
responses following observed impulsive choices after reversals in
Study 3 (see Section 5.2.1). This likely led to overall higher weights
for impulsive ds (and thus more balanced weighting of the two
types of observed choices) in the iterative free parameter optimiza-
tion. Such increased learning from impulsive choices was most
likely a consequence of introducing a more volatile reward envi-
ronment with more frequent reversals. This could have amplified
participants’ exploration propensity (i.e., the spontaneous testing
of the alternative, non-rewarded choice option) specifically
towards the anticipated end of each reversal episode. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the choice accuracy results in
Study 3 (see Section 5.2.1) showing a conservative bias after Pro-
bErrs but an equal influence of conservative and impulsive choices
after reversals.
In sum, Study 3 replicated the substantial social influences
during observational reversal learning from Study 1 using data
from a larger, independent sample. Moreover, Study 3 provides
evidence that the bias towards selective learning from observed
conservative behavior is mitigated in a less stable decisional
context.
Fig. 7. Choice accuracy (for the truly correct color) as a function of trial position and social influence in Study 2. (A) Accuracy for trials +1 and +2 after the first probabilistic
error (ProbErr) in a reversal episode. (B) Accuracy for trials +1 and +2 after the second ProbErr in a reversal episode. (C) Accuracy for trials +1 and +2 after reversals. Error bars
show standard errors of the mean. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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The goal of the simulation analysis was to explore the adaptiv-
ity of the choice behaviors implemented in our computational
models within the present task framework. Specifically, we wanted
to compare relative usefulness of the different types of integrative
learning (such as differential versus identical weighting of conser-
vative versus impulsive choices), using iterations of learning rate
levels and a large number of randomly generated reversal learning
sequences.
6.1. Methods
Random learning sequences were constructed within the gen-
eral design constraints of the present paradigm but included
stochastic reward frequencies at different probability levels: We
constructed sequences to have 36 reversal episodes with a random
length of 7–15 trials each. Within each reversal episode the
reward-punishment probability for the correct stimulus was either
0.8/0.2 or 0.6/0.4, and vice versa 0.2/0.8 or 0.4/0.6 for the incorrect
stimulus. The other player’s response was simulated to be the cor-
rect choice (according to the reversal episode) in all trials except in
some of the trials following punishments: In half of the reversal
episodes the other player switched to the incorrect stimulus after
punishments (impulsive behavior), in half of the other episodes,
the other player stayed with the previously correct choice (conser-
vative behavior), with the order of conservative/impulsive epi-
sodes randomly determined. In addition, after conservative
episodes the other played perseverated to the previously correct
color for two trials. Average performance of each model was com-
puted for 10,000 permutations (sequences) of the outlined ran-
domization parameters. For each sequence and model we
calculated Q-based action selection probabilities Pblue and Pgreen
according to each model’s specific learning algorithms and then
computed average % correct choices for each learning rate (ar or
as) iterated between 0.05 and 1 (0.05 increments). To reduce the
number of free parameters and across models, bs were set to a
fixed value of 0.2 corresponding to its average estimated value in
data of Study 1. Similarly, for accuracy simulations of the imitative
and integrative models ar was set to a constant value of 0.5.
6.2. Results
For the high reward probability condition (0.8/0.2), the main
results were as follows: Standard Q-learning (‘social ignorer’)
reached high accuracy levels of nearly 75% if sufficiently high
learning rates were applied (>0.3). Integrating reward and social
information reached comparable accuracy only when the same as
was applied to conservative and impulsive ds and when theinformation was integrated instantaneously rather than with a
delay (Fig. 8B–D). Performance based on instantaneous integra-
tion and the same as peaked at an as of around 0.25, i.e., at
substantially higher levels than the modeled as for negative
ds (0.05), suggesting that participants in Study 1 had underweighted
impulsive ds to optimize performance. Imitative learning did not
lead to accuracies levels as high as those of standard-Q learning
and instantaneous integration (same as). The worst performing
model was instantaneous integration with different as (Fig. 8C),
showing accuracies on average 10% lower than the most success-
ful models.
In the simulations with low reward probability accuracy was
substantially decreased across all learning models compared to
those with high reward probability. Imitative learning outper-
formed all other models while performance of standard Q-
learning dropped markedly, which can be attributed to the
decreased reliability of reward information. Again, within the inte-
grative models we found optimal performance for instantaneous
integration using the same as. In general, accuracy in the low
reward probability simulations increased progressively with
increased weighting of social information.
The question arises why these effects – higher adaptivity of
ignoring social information when reward information is reliable,
higher adaptivity of social learning when reward information is
unreliable – are compatible with the notion that the observed
agent is exposed to the same reward sequence as the observing
agent. However, it should be emphasized that in our simulations
the observed agent did not ‘‘learn” from the reward outcomes in
a technical sense; instead choice behavior (and thus accuracy)
was predetermined (see methods 6.1: 100% accuracy in standard
trials, fixed number of errors after punishments). Thus, simulated
accuracy of social learning was only as good as the fixed validity
of social information allowed it to be. General inferences about
the adaptivity of social learning thus cannot be drawn. Importantly
though, as wemapped the validity of social information in our sim-
ulations onto its manipulation in our empirical studies, the simula-
tion results can be used to evaluate whether participants under- or
over-utilized reward and social information in the present
decision-making framework: Together, our simulation results sug-
gest that in our paradigm, which was characterized by relatively
high reward probabilities, individuals generally over-utilized social
information, even though adding social prediction errors to the
information that could be gained from reward alone was not nec-
essarily adaptive.
On the other hand, participants under-utilized information
from impulsive choices: Simulations demonstrated that social
information improved performance only when both conservative
and impulsive ds were integrated with equal weights, with an opti-
mal as of around 0.1–0.3 for both types of prediction errors.
Fig. 8. Results of the simulation analysis. Average accuracy of the different computational models was computed across 10,000 randomly generated reversal learning
sequences (each containing 36 reversal episodes with 7–15 trials) that included both social and reward information. Correct responses were rewarded probabilistically and
accuracy was computed for high probability (P reward = 0.8, P punishment = 0.2) and low probability (0.6/0.4) sequences separately. Social information contained in random
order conservative (cons) choices in half of the reversal episodes and impulsive choices in the other half. Average accuracy was calculated for different reward (standard Q-
learning) or social learning rates (imitative and integrative models) varying between 0.05 and 1. For the integrative models using two as, accuracy was computed for low
(=0.1), medium (=0.5) and high (=0.9) levels of conservative as and an impulsive as varying between 0.05 and 1. (A) Results for the non-integrative models (standard Q- and
imitative learning), (B–D) results for the integrative models.
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The present results demonstrate that observing others critically
influences learning of reversing reward contingencies and that
individuals integrate an observed agent’s choice into learning in
form of a ‘social prediction error’ (ds). Specifically, ds in combina-
tion with the standard reward prediction error (dr) jointly explain
participants’ choices better than models that assume that people
rely on either of these sources of information alone (i.e. ‘social
ignoring’ or ‘blind following’).
Our data demonstrate and replicate the substantial impact of
the observed agent’s type of choice behavior: Learners followanother player’s choice readily if the choice matches their recent
choice preference (a ‘conservative’ choice), even this led to a higher
number of perseveration errors. The influence of observed conser-
vative choices was pervasive, affecting decisions after ProbErrs and
reversals and conditions with moderate (Study 1) and high (Study
3) reversal volatility. In contrast, observed impulsive choices
affected decisions only after reversals and if reversal volatility
was sufficiently high (Study 3).
Such selective influence of observed conservative choices –
which we demonstrate despite the participants’ knowledge that
reward contingencies could reverse – has implications for real-
life choice situations in which well-established behavioral routines
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in such situations social models in the environment are capable to
reinforce the maintenance of established choice preferences, even
though these choices are no longer rewarded or the reward is
experienced as less pleasant. Such scenarios can be easily mapped,
for instance, onto the role of peer models in food choice behavior
during development but also onto the role of social factors in
changing unhealthy habits during adulthood.
The notion of a selective influence of (conservative) choices that
match established preferences is consistent with a ‘confirmation
bias’, reflecting the tendency to selectively seek or use information
that is consistent with one’s preconceptions (Nickerson, 1998). The
confirmation bias has been recognized as a ubiquitous phe-
nomenon manifesting itself in a variety of domains, ranging from
attention to memory and formal reasoning (Nickerson, 1998). In
the context of reward-based decision-making, a confirmation bias
towards verbal information given before learning, was shown to
modulate the weighting of outcomes received in the feedback
phase (Doll, Hutchison, & Frank, 2011). Moreover, there is an open
debate on the extent to which cognitive biases, such as the confir-
mation bias, reflect mental ‘flaws’ or have adaptive utility and even
lead to more accurate responses than unbiased responses
(Gigerenzer, 1991). Our tasks were not designed to allow a quan-
tification of the utility of following social information in general
as we deliberately presented sub-optimal choice behavior.
Nonetheless, our simulation results suggest that integrating social
information in the present experimental framework did not neces-
sarily help participants to maximize their earnings, especially not
when participants weighted observed conservative choices more
than impulsive choices. It is possible, though, that following con-
servative choices evoked a subjective reduction of uncertainty
(not measured in the present studies), which has been shown to
mediate social influence in situations of limited stimulus informa-
tion (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993). The idea of selec-
tive weighting of social information to achieve ‘re-assurance’ is
also consistent with recent work on the evolutionary bases of con-
formity (i.e. adoption of behaviors displayed by groups) and social
learning, highlighting that participants’ confidence and uncertainty
critically affect the strength of social influences (Morgan, Rendell,
Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012).
Another recent study pertinent to our findings showed that
social influence exerted by another observed learner during prob-
abilistic decision-making increased with the observable skill level
of the demonstrator (Selbing et al., 2014). Such selective influence
of competent others fits well with animal research showing that
successful models are more likely to be copied (Laland, 2004). In
our study, we balanced performance (inferred skill) levels between
the conservative and impulsive conditions, which enabled us to
extend these findings by showing that even subjective criteria
not linked to competencies, in our case the incidental similarity
conferred by a shared birthday, mediate social learning. These
effects are consistent with other work showing that incidental sim-
ilarity increases compliance with requests (Burger et al., 2004) or
behavioral mimicry (Guéguen & Martin, 2009). Incidental similar-
ity is assumed to elicit a coarse form of information processing
guiding decisions based on heuristics rather than careful consider-
ations of the choice options (Burger et al., 2004). Specifically,
salient features indicating similarity will shift attention to other
features perceived as similar rather than attributes indicating dis-
similarity (Mussweiler, 2003). In accordance with this theory, inci-
dental similarity in our study selectively increased as for
conservative ds, that is, similar players induced an even stronger
conservative bias than dissimilar players. The modulation by inter-
personal similarity also supports the notion that the current pat-
tern of results can be attributed to social-cognitive processes
rather than arising from simple associative learning. Simple asso-ciative learning should have resulted in a similar conservative bias
in both similarity groups which we did not find.
Consistent with our results, a social modulation of reward-
based decision-making was recently shown in two-armed bandit
tasks with fixed (non-reversed) reward probabilities (Burke et al.,
2010), instrumental conditioning with liquid rewards (Cooper
et al., 2012) and advice-based tasks (Behrens et al., 2008; Biele
et al., 2011). Furthermore, brain imaging findings suggest that
expectancy violations in the social domain engage similar brain
regions as prediction errors during reinforcement learning
(Harris & Fiske, 2010). Other brain imaging work has supported
the existence of an ‘action prediction error’ (Burke et al., 2010),
reflecting the difference between predicted and observed choices
of another agent and underpinned by regionally specific activation
changes in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Critically, in contrast
to our paradigm, these studies did not compare different attributes
and choice behaviors displayed by the observed agent that modu-
late these computational signals. Accordingly, ‘action prediction
errors’ were modeled as non-signed variables (Burke et al., 2010).
Another type of social prediction error has been described for the
observation of (independently varied) outcomes received by the
other agent and associated with neural responses in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (Burke et al., 2010) and dorsal striatum (Cooper
et al., 2012). In our study, we did not vary outcomes for real and
observed players independently, making the ‘observational out-
come prediction error’ (Burke et al., 2010) temporally overlap with
the (experiential) reward prediction error. Such joint outcomes are
assumed to signal prediction errors related to the ‘trustworthiness’
of the other player and recruit brain regions involved in social eval-
uation (Behrens et al., 2008). As outlined above, these social-
evaluative factors related to the other’s competence or trustwor-
thiness may have been captured by the delay component in our
models.
We used comparatively simple Q-learning algorithms to model
our data. Q-learning has successfully been applied to predict
choices during reversal learning by other groups (Jocham et al.,
2009). While more sophisticated approaches like Hidden Markov
models may alter overall goodness-of-fit results (Hampton,
Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2006), we do not expect that they would
change the pattern of results as observed here (e.g. relative
explanatory advantage for models with integrative strategies). A
promising perspective for future studies would also be to use
dynamic rather than fixed weighting factors to model socially
mediated decision-making. For instance in Pearce-Hall models
(Pearce & Hall, 1980), instead of assigning a constant learning rate
that scales prediction errors throughout the learning process, the
amount of learning is dependent on attentional deployment (‘‘ass
ociability”), which in turn varies depending on prediction errors
experienced in preceding trials.8. Conclusions and implications
Our findings highlight the pivotal role of social influence in
human cognition, demonstrating that even basic mechanisms such
as reversal learning are affected by observation of other people’s
behavior. We show that in scenarios implementing decisional
uncertainty by reversing reward contingencies individuals com-
bine social and non-social information to guide their decision.
However, individuals learn more strongly from information that
is provided by observed agents who are perceived as similar, even
if this perception is based on minimalistic and task-irrelevant
information (shared birthday). Interpersonal similarity is a potent
trigger and modulator of various social behaviors ranging from
altruistic punishment (Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 2013) to evalua-
tions of others (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). Our results suggest
32 N. Ihssen et al. / Cognition 153 (2016) 19–32that similarity modulates even more basic cognitive processes,
such as reversal learning.
Learners generally exhibited a ‘conservative bias’ towards social
cues that conformed to their preconceptions. We demonstrate how
these biases can be incorporated into formalized learning models.
Knowledge about such social trajectories in decision-making is
important for psychological research into the determinants of
human choices in natural contexts, especially if choices are influ-
enced by others, such as in voting or consumer behavior. Moreover,
the right balance of reward-based versus social-observational
learning is often crucial for the success or failure of education pro-
grams or interventions for behavioral change. The formal models
proposed here can inform and optimize the design of such pro-
grams and interventions, specifically if the approaches include ‘role
model’ behavior to promote learning.
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